Cross-country comparative analysis of social policy process: Implications for sustainable development in Vietnam

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Abstract: This study explores how social policy institutions contribute to an "equal and fair society." Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on OECD and EU data, it examines six institutional conditions: election processes, transparency, civil rights, rule of law, executive capacity, and accountability. The findings highlight those strong democratic processes and robust institutional capacity are crucial for equitable outcomes. Vietnam's socio-economic progress and challenges are analyzed to draw lessons for developing nations, emphasizing institutional reforms to enhance governance, equity, and sustainability. The study offers insights for policymakers to design inclusive and resilient social policies.

Keywords: Institutional governance, Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), Social policy, Sustainability.

1. Introduction

Social policy serves as a vital mechanism for addressing societal needs and enhancing citizens' resilience to future crises. Defined as a "diffuse, residual category" (Wilensky, 1987, p. 381), social policy often encompasses publicly provided or regulated programs such as income generation, social security, social work, and poverty alleviation. These programs collectively underpin the broader concept of the welfare state, which Kwon (2013) describes as "a framework of public institutions and policies designed to provide social protection to citizens." Within this framework, various typologies of social policy exist across sectors—education, health, family welfare, pensions, housing, and social inclusion—each contributing to the overall well-being of society.

The effectiveness of social policy is influenced significantly by domestic governance structures and institutional arrangements (Gough, 2015). Welfare regimes, characterized by unique patterns of state and policy interactions, provide a lens to examine how different nations approach social protection and inclusion (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). This approach bridges the gap between Northern and Southern contexts, offering insights that extend beyond imposing Northern frameworks onto other regions. The current research seeks to explore these dynamics further by addressing the critical question: What combinations of socio-political institutional conditions foster equitable and effective social policy outcomes?

2. Theoretical Framework

Comparative social policy, while not a distinct academic discipline, has emerged as a vital field of public policy study (Clasen, 2015). It examines how varying institutional arrangements influence policy outcomes, with a particular focus on the welfare state's evolution and its impact on societal well-being. Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) typology of welfare regimes—social democratic, liberal democratic, and conservative—provides a foundational framework for understanding these institutional dynamics. Each regime represents a unique configuration of state-market-family relationships that shape social policy priorities and outcomes.

In developing contexts, the complexity of social policy regimes is often amplified by historical, political, and socio-economic factors. Gough (2015) identifies a distinct cluster of welfare regimes in

developing countries, often shaped by colonial legacies, weak state capacities, and fragmented institutional frameworks. This complexity necessitates methodological tools capable of capturing the interplay between multiple institutional variables and their impact on social policy outcomes.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) offers a robust methodology for such explorations, bridging qualitative and quantitative paradigms (Ragin, 1987; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). QCA enables researchers to identify causal pathways and configurations of conditions that lead to specific outcomes. This study employs crisp-set QCA (csQCA) to examine six key institutional variables: election processes, transparency, civil rights and political liberties, rule of law, executive policy capacity, and executive accountability. By analyzing these variables across OECD and EU countries, the research seeks to uncover the institutional configurations that contribute to an "equal and fair society," defined as inclusive and sustainable social policy outcomes.

The conceptual foundation of this study also draws on insights from governance and institutional economics. Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Kitschelt (2015) highlight the significance of democratic capacity, electoral rules, and institutional accountability in shaping policy effectiveness. Moreover, transparency and access to information are critical for fostering trust and participation in policy-making processes (Fumagalli & Narciso, 2012). These factors, when integrated with robust executive policy capacity and accountability mechanisms, create a conducive environment for achieving equitable social policy outcomes.

In the context of Vietnam, these theoretical insights hold particular relevance. Over the past three decades, Vietnam has transitioned from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system, achieving significant socio-economic progress. However, persistent challenges—including poverty, inequality, and weak governance—underscore the need for institutional reforms to enhance social policy effectiveness. This study aims to draw lessons from the OECD and EU experiences to inform policy innovations that can support Vietnam's sustainable development goals.

3. Background Information

3.1. Case specification

The study's case selection incorporates OECD and EU countries due to their long-standing emphasis on sustainable governance and well-documented social policy data. These regions provide diverse institutional frameworks, which allow for a robust comparative analysis. The inclusion of these countries ensures the identification of causal configurations that can serve as benchmarks for other contexts, such as Vietnam.

Data sources include sustainable governance indicators from official statistical platforms like OECD's database (OECD, 2014) and UN datasets (United Nations, 2014). The datasets encompass social policy outcomes and institutional variables, ensuring comprehensive coverage of relevant factors. Qualitative reports accompany quantitative measures to contextualize findings within each country's socio-political landscape.

Four stages of data consolidation were undertaken to ensure validity and reliability: data extraction, coding into dichotomous variables, threshold calibration, and cross-validation with in-depth country reports. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the study evaluates how configurations of six institutional conditions—election processes, transparency, civil rights and political liberties, rule of law, executive policy capacity, and executive accountability—contribute to achieving an "equal and fair society."

Vietnam's inclusion as a contextual reference highlights the importance of adapting insights to developing countries. With its unique socio-economic trajectory—marked by rapid development yet persistent inequalities—Vietnam offers a critical perspective for understanding how institutional reform can influence social policy effectiveness. While the empirical focus remains on OECD and EU nations, Vietnam's experiences serve as a backdrop to draw actionable implications for sustainability and governance improvements.

3.2. Background Information About Vietnam

Vietnam's socio-economic transformation over the past three decades has been remarkable. From one of the world's poorest nations in the 1980s, Vietnam has emerged as a lower middle-income country, achieving significant improvements in living standards. Economic reforms, initiated under the Đổi Mới (Renovation) policy in 1986, catalyzed a shift from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system. This transition spurred rapid GDP growth, averaging 6.4% annually in the 2000s, and lifted millions out of poverty. By 2023, Vietnam's per capita income had risen to approximately $5,000, compared to just $100 in the late 1980s.

Vietnam's achievements extend beyond economic growth. Social indicators, such as life expectancy, maternal mortality, and literacy rates, have improved markedly. The country has achieved several Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) ahead of schedule. For instance, access to electricity rose from under 50% of households in 1993 to nearly universal coverage today. Similarly, access to clean water and modern sanitation has increased significantly, benefiting over 75% of households.

However, these successes mask persistent challenges. Poverty reduction gains remain fragile, with a significant portion of the population still living near the poverty line. Ethnic minorities, who make up approximately 15% of the population, account for half of the nation's poor. These groups face heightened vulnerability to economic shocks, climate change, and natural disasters, which collectively pose substantial risks to development gains.

Environmental sustainability is another pressing issue. Rapid industrialization has led to significant environmental degradation, including air and water pollution, deforestation, and resource depletion. The economic cost of natural disasters and environmental stress is estimated at 1-1.5% of GDP annually. Urban areas, particularly industrial zones, suffer from acute pollution levels, further exacerbating health and social disparities.

Governance and institutional weaknesses also hinder Vietnam's development. Despite progress, the quality of public administration remains uneven. Overlapping mandates, limited accountability, and fragmented state structures have hampered policy implementation. Weak citizen participation in governance processes and limited access to information further undermine transparency and accountability. Electoral processes and legislative oversight need strengthening to ensure equitable representation and effective policy-making.

Addressing these challenges requires a multifaceted approach. Institutional reforms to enhance transparency, accountability, and policy capacity are essential. Strengthening governance mechanisms and fostering inclusive participation can help bridge gaps in social equity. Moreover, integrating environmental sustainability into policy frameworks is critical for ensuring long-term resilience and development. By leveraging lessons from OECD and EU countries, Vietnam can adopt best practices tailored to its unique context, promoting sustainable and inclusive growth.

4. Research Methodology

On QCA convention, we focus on model specification. First, we thought about the quantitative methods, for example the regression can be appropriate, but the quantitative data is not available for social policy outcomes and conditional variables' it is therefore not feasible for the quantitative methods. As well as this, it is difficult to interpret and explain the configuration of the conditional variables related to social policy outcomes. At the same time, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is geared towards systematic cross-case comparison; thus, it is an appropriate method to tackle this research question. Indeed, "from a small number of cases, the QCA method makes it possible to derive patterns (combinations of factors, or conditions) that link the cases" (see Ragin 1987 and Rihoux 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013 and Varone et al 2006). The QCA approach was chosen because this method allows a combination of case- and variable-based comparisons for the comparative analysis. The QCA approach allows to systematically compare a "small N" or "intermediate N" of cases. Specifically, the QCA technique, through its minimization procedures (see below), allows to systematically identify the core configurations of condition variables, which is a unique feature of that method. In the QCA approach, exploiting the epistemological case-based knowledge and logic of comparative method and causal mechanism allows the identification of more than one unique path to an outcome (equifinality). In other

words, it is more than one combination of conditions may account for a given result or outcome; this is also useful for pluralist/participative analysis (Rihoux 2006).

Based on these premises, we assume that the outcomes of social policies are shaped and influenced by configurations of policy institutions, in particular in terms of democracy capacity, government policy capacity and government responsibility, following the model developed below:

4.1. Outcome Variable: Equal and Fair Society [EFs]

The outcome variable, "Equal and Fair Society" (EFs), represents the societal objective of achieving inclusivity, equity, and sustainability through effective social policies. An equal and fair society ensures that all individuals have access to opportunities, resources, and protections, fostering a sense of belonging and reducing disparities.

In this study, the EFs outcome is operationalized based on indicators such as the quality of inclusive education, socio-political measures for social inclusion, equity in healthcare access, the effectiveness of pension policies in preventing old-age poverty, and the integration of marginalized groups, including migrants. These indicators reflect the degree to which social policies contribute to reducing inequality and enhancing social cohesion.

Following QCA conventions, the EFs variable is dichotomized to facilitate comparative analysis. It is coded as "1" for countries where social policy outcomes surpass a defined threshold, indicating high levels of inclusivity and fairness. Conversely, it is coded as "0" for countries falling below this threshold, signifying weaker social outcomes. The threshold is determined through empirical analysis of country scores on key indicators, ensuring a clear distinction between high-performing and low-performing cases.

By focusing on EFs, this study underscores the importance of institutional configurations in shaping equitable social outcomes. It highlights how combinations of democratic processes, transparency, rule of law, and policy capacity can foster environments where fairness and inclusion thrive.

4.2. Defining Condition Variables
4.2.1. Condition 1: Election Process [ELPR]

The election process is measured by voting and registration rights in which candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication, all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections, private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction, citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so.

The ELPR variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it is fallen below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 6 and 7. Considering exploratory tests, we chose to place the threshold at 7, which also corresponds to a gap in the distribution, between scores of 6.8 and 7.2 (see Table 2).

Table 2.
Raw data table.

Cases	ELPR	TRANS	CRPL	RULA	EXPC	EXAC	Outcomes
Australia	8.4	7	7.7	8.3	7.2	7.2	6.9
Austria	7.6	6.3	7.3	8.3	6.2	7	6.3
Belgium	7.4	7	7.3	7.8	5.7	7	6.3
Bulgaria	6.8	5.3	6.3	4.8	4.8	5.3	4.6
Canada	8.2	6.7	8.3	7.5	7.6	6.5	7.3
Chile	5.6	7	6.3	7.8	6.5	5.9	5.3
Croatia	6	5.3	5.7	5.5	4.6	5.1	5.1
Cyprus	5.8	6	7.7	6	3.1	4.7	5.7
Czech Rep.	8	8.3	7.3	6.8	5.1	6.7	6.6
Denmark	8.4	9	8.7	9.8	8.4	8.2	7.6
Estonia	7.6	9.3	8.7	7.5	6.4	6.4	7.1
Finland	8.8	10	9.3	8.3	8.6	8.1	7.8
France	7.8	6	7.7	6.3	6.6	5.4	6.7
Germany	8.8	8.3	8.7	8.8	6.9	7.5	6.9
Greece	7.2	7	6.7	7	4.3	5.5	4.5
Hungary	5.6	5	6	3.5	5.2	4.9	4.7
Iceland	7.6	6.7	9	7	6.3	7.1	7.3
Ireland	8.2	8.7	9	7.5	6.4	6.5	6.8
Israel	7.4	7.3	5.7	7.3	6.4	6.4	6.1
Italy	7.2	6.3	7.3	6.5	5.8	6.1	5.3
Japan	6.8	6.3	6.7	4.8	6.2	5.9	6
Latvia	7.6	8.7	8	8	7.4	5	5.3
Lithuania	8.4	8.3	8	7.8	7.1	5.5	6.5
Luxembourg	7.4	7.3	8.3	8	6.8	7.9	7.4
Malta	5.2	5	6.3	4.8	4.8	5.9	5.2
Mexico	6.8	6.3	5	5.5	6.5	5.8	4.5
Netherlands	7.2	7.7	8.7	7.3	6.3	6.6	7.1
New Zealand	8.2	7.3	9.3	9.5	8.2	6.7	7.8
Norway	7.8	9.7	9.3	9.3	8.1	8.6	7.6
Poland	8.8	8.3	8.3	8	7.2	6.2	6.1
Portugal	7.2	7	8.3	7.5	6.1	5.3	5.5
Romania	5.4	5	5.7	4.8	4.4	4.6	4.7
Slovakia	8.2	7.3	6.7	6	5.4	5.4	5.6
Slovenia	8.4	7	7.7	6.8	4.4	6.2	6.4
South Korea	6.6	4.7	5	6.3	6.7	5.6	6.2
Spain	6.8	6.3	7.7	7	6.3	6.3	5.9
Sweden	8.6	9.3	9.3	9.8	8.4	8.4	7.8
Switzerland	8.2	9.7	8.7	8.3	7.2	6.7	7
Turkey	5.2	5	4	4.8	6.1	5.2	4.5
UK	6.6	7.3	7.7	7.8	7.2	6.6	7.3
USA	7.8	9	8.7	8	7.6	7.2	6.5

Source: (Result of SGI's survey, see http://www.sgi-network.org).

4.2.2. Condition 2: Transparency Measured by the Level of Information Access [TRANS]

It is measured by the independent media from government. More precisely: to what extent is the media subject to government influence and the influence of actors associated with the government and focuses both on media regulation and government intervention. It is also measured by the media ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions that the predominance of either private or

public ownership guarantees a pluralism of opinions. Rather, the underlying assumption is that a diversified ownership structure is likely to best represent the views and positions existing in society. It is also measured by citizens ability to obtain official information. Here the accessibility of government information examined though (i) whether a freedom of information act (or equivalent legal regulations) exists, (ii) to what extent do the rules restrict access to information (e.g., exemptions, deadlines for responding to requests etc.) and justify these restrictions, and (iii) whether mechanisms for appeal and oversight exist to enforce citizens' right to access information (e.g., administrative review, court review, ombudsman, commission etc.).

The TRANS variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it falls below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 6.3 and 7. After exploratory tests and a careful examination of the empirical distribution on that condition, we placed the threshold at 6.5.

4.2.3. Condition 3: Civil Rights and Political Liberties [CPRL]

Civil rights and political liberties are measured by the extent to which the state respect and protect civil rights, and how effectively citizens are protected by courts against infringements of their rights. This also encompasses the extent to which civil rights contain and limit the exercise of state power by the rule of law and independent courts guarantee legal protection of life, freedom and property as well as protection against illegitimate arrest, exile, terror, torture or unjustifiable intervention into personal life. Equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law are both basic civil rights and also necessities to enforce civil rights. They are also measured by the extent the state concedes and protect political liberties and as such the degree to which political liberties constitute an independent sphere of democracy.

The CRPL variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it falls below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 6.3 and 7.3. After exploratory tests and a careful examination of the empirical distribution on that condition, we placed the threshold at 7.

4.2.4. Condition 4: Rule of Law [RULA]

It is measured firstly by the extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty which assesses the extent to which executive actions are predictable. Secondly, by the extent of the independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law which examines how well the courts can review actions taken and norms adopted by the executive.

Thirdly by the process of appointing in supreme or constitutional court justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary regarding supreme or constitutional courts' sufficient independence from political influence as a prerequisite of a functioning democratic system. The appointment process is a crucial factor for it determines judiciary independence. fourthly by the extent of public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests which addresses how the state and society prevent public servants and politicians from accepting bribes by applying mechanisms to guarantee the integrity of officeholders in auditing of state spending, regulation of party financing; citizen and media access to information; accountability of officeholders including asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of conduct; transparent public procurement systems; effective prosecution of corruption. Some data from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International is also used to discuss.

The RULA variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it falls below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 5.5 and 6.5. After exploratory tests and a careful examination of the empirical distribution on that condition, we placed the threshold at 6.09.

4.2.5. Condition 5: Executive Policy Capacity [EXPC]

The executive capacity focuses on the core activities of a government and examines the steering

capabilities demonstrated by a political system's administrative apparatus. This includes strategic planning, inter-ministerial coordination, knowledge management, consultation and communication processes, as well as policy implementation and institutional learning capacity. They are measured by the evidence-based policy making with RIA application as well as the quality and sustainability of the RIA process and the extent to which the government consults with economic and social actors in the course of policy preparation. Policy communication also plays an important role in policy formulation; this is tapped by a question on how government coordinates policy communication to ensure that statements align with government strategy. Further, the effectiveness of policy implementation is measured by the government implement policies effectively.

The **EXPC** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it falls below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 5.4 and 6.2. After exploratory tests and a careful examination of the empirical distribution on that condition, we placed the threshold at 6.

4.2.6. Condition 6: Executive Accountability [EXAC]

Executive Accountability is measured by the interaction between a government and other stakeholders in the policymaking process, seeking to assess the extent to which participation and oversight competencies are produced and cultivated. Thus, it examines the extent to which the other actors perform essential functions in consolidating and mediating interests in a political system, are able to participate in policymaking and monitor the process at each step along the way. The capacity to exercise this oversight function in part reflects the government's obligation to account for its actions to citizens, parliaments, the media, parties and interest groups. Moreover, executive accountability addresses the effectiveness of government communication, examining how well a government acquires and disseminates information, and the extent to which it involves and activates various elements of society in formulating and implementing policy. It therefore includes a series of indicators assessing the degree to which governments consult entities such as special-interest groups early in legislative planning processes. That category also includes indicators that establish the extent to which the associations, citizens and legislatures possess participatory competences such as knowledge of politics, financial resources, etc. In short, this is about the checks and balances and participatory processes that can enhance the quality of political decision-making.

The **EXAC** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it falls below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 5.4 and 5.9. After exploratory tests and a careful examination of the empirical distribution on that condition, we placed the threshold at 5.45. See Table 2 presents the raw data, with the outcome variable and the six condition variables – i.e., the data before the dichotomization procedure.

5. Results

The data is processed with the TOSMANA software, a specialized tool to analyze cross-case regularities in Small- and Intermediate-N Analysis. By means of Boolean minimization algorithms based on Boolean logic, dichotomized variables can be processed in a stepwise manner, which results in a formula (also named 'solution') explaining the outcome by a combination of conditional variables (see Cronqvist (2005), Rihoux (2006, 2009), Rihoux and Ragin (2008). We chose csQCA (crisp-set QCA) instead of mvQCA (multi-value QCA) or fsQCA (fuzzy-set QCA) because we are looking for major analytical contrasts (De Meur, Rihoux and Yamasaki 2009) and also strive to achieve strong parsimony through the analysis.

The QCA 'truth table' (table of configurations) contains the six crisp-set (i.e., dichotomous) in causal conditions which were hypothesized as condition variables, and which together constitute configurations leading to the possible outcome, for the 41 country cases (OECD and EU countries) – see Table 3.

Table 3.
Truth table of Boolean Configurations with six causal conditions & 'equal and fair society' social policy outcome.

ID	ELPR	TRANS	CRPL	RULA	EXPC	EXAC	EFs
Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Latvia, Portugal	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Turkey	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
France	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
Slovakia	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Greece	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
South Korea	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Mexico, Japan	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Chile	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Italy	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Spain	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Israel	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
UK	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Austria	1	0	1	1	1	1	1

In terms of data analysis, across these country cases, the SGI survey data translated into Boolean variables (see above) will enable us to identify the expected multiple forms of causality linking the 6 conditions and the outcome variable.

The csQCA procedure produces the minimal combinations of conditions for the outcome using the Quine-McCluskey Boolean minimization algorithm. The empirical configurations in the truth table were simplified, and those configurations that were theoretically possible but which were not empirically observed in 41 these cases (so-called 'logical cases') were also included in the minimization. The inclusion of logical cases enables us to generalize the explanatory patterns that are suggested by the observed cases. In the analysis, with six dichotomous causal conditions, there are theoretically 2^6 (2^k) = 64 possible combinations of conditions.

In our first round of analyses, we faced the problem of the presence of two 'contradictory configurations' (some cases with the same condition values, but with different outcome values). The first contradictory configuration included Latvia, Lithuania and Poland; the second group contradictory configuration included Slovakia and Slovenia. In order to solve these contradictions, we chose to fine-tune the thresholds for the outcome and for some condition variables, also considering country-specific evidence; this is one of the csQCA good practises (Rihoux and De Meur 2009). This lead is to modify slightly the thresholds for the ELPR, RULA and EXPC conditions, which were found to generate the contradiction amongst these two groups of countries.

5.1. Minimization of "Equal and Fair Society" Outcome

In order to conduct the Boolean minimization, the TOSMANA software first produced the truth table (Table 3) with 18 configurations: 7 configurations with a [1] outcome, corresponding to 25 cases; and 11 configurations with a [0] outcome, corresponding to 16 cases. We can see in the truth table that, in spite of the simplification of the data through the dichotomization process, so it is quite a good level of empirical diversity is maintained. This is very useful to obtain a stronger QCA, with more meaningful minimal formulas. We also note that the evidence is, on the whole, quite consistent with the theory, as most countries with a [0] outcome tend to also display a predominance of [0] conditions; and conversely: most countries with a [1] outcome tend to also display a predominance of [1] conditions.

As recommended in QCA good practices (Rihoux - Ragin and de Meur, 2009, pp.33-66, Do et al 2013), we run the minimization procedure twice and separately, first for the [1] configurations, and then for the [0] configurations; and we run these minimizations without and with the inclusion of logical remainders. We have chosen not to run necessity tests (i.e. computing consistency coefficients; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), because we do not assume strong independent effect from single, separate conditions on the outcome. We have however checked for the potential existence of 'trivial' conditions, and did not identify any.

5.2. Minimizing Value the [1] Configurations (Without Logical Remainders)

The TOSMANA software minimizes the [1] configurations without including non-observed cases (i.e. without logical remainders). After the Boolean minimization, we obtain the following minimal formula shown below:

ELPR{1} * TRANS{0} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} +	ELPR{1} * TRANS{1} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXAC{1} +	ELPR{1} * TRANS{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{1} +	TRANS{1} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{1} +	ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * CRPL{0} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{1}
(France+ Austria)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Israel)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ UK)	(South Korea)

We choose to re-write it as follows (formula 1):

ELPR{1} * TRANS{1} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXAC{1} + ELPR{1} * TRANS{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{1} + TRANS{1} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{1} → 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy.

We can reduce as follows (formula 2):

TRANS{1} * RULA{1} * EXAC{1}* [ELPR{1} * CRPL{1} + ELPR{1} * EXPC{1} + CRPL{1} * EXPC{1}] → 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy.

In formula 1, we see that there are 17 countries gathering in three configurations, and we can see that the following contribute to the differences between the configurations: Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium, Israel and UK.

Examining the reduced formula 2, we can see that all these 17 cases share three important conditions: TRANS{1} * RULA{1} * EXAC{1}. Thus, there is a difference of causal combinations among these countries. However, the formula is quite complex, so only a limited level of parsimony has been achieved. This being said, we can already identify some important conditions shared by the three alternative combinations: strong transparency measured by level of information access, strong rule of law, strong executive accountability may produce the positive outcome 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy. We also observe the importance of RULA{1} * EXPC{1} in the case of France, Austria and South Korea. Note also that, in spite of the low value on TRANS in three cases, this still generates a positive outcome.

5.3. Minimizing Value the [0] Configurations (Without Logical Remainders)

Secondly, TOSMANA software running with the same procedure, this time for the [0] configurations and also without including some non-observed cases (the logical remainders are excluded). The results are as follows:

ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * CRPL{0} * RULA{0} +	ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * RULA{0} * EXPC{0} * EXAC{0} +	ELPR{1} * TRANS{1} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{0} +	ELPR{1} * TRANS{1} * CRPL{0} * RULA{0} * EXPC{0} * EXAC{0} +	ELPR{1} * TRANS{1} * CRPL{0} * RULA{1} * EXPC{0} * EXAC{1} +	ELPR{0} * TRANS{1} * CRPL{0} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{1} +	ELPR{1} * TRANS{0} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{0} * EXAC{1} +	ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * CRPL{1} * RULA{1} * EXPC{1} * EXAC{1}
(Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria+ Turkey+ Mexico, Japan+ Malta)	(Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria+ Cyprus)	(Latvia, Portugal)	(Slovakia)	(Greece)	(Chile)	(Italy)	(Spain)

We chose two first terms. This enables us to re-write the formula as follows (formula 3):

ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * CRPL{0} * RULA{0} + ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * RULA{0} * EXPC{0} * EXAC{0} → negative outcome 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy.

We can reduce and obtain formula 4:

ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * RULA{0} [CRPL{0} + EXPC{0} * EXAC{0}] → negative outcome 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy.

Once again, the formula is quite complex, which means that a only small level of parsimony has been achieved. However, we can observe that the countries of Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Bulgaria presented in formula three can be contrasted with Turkey, Mexico, Japan, Malta and Cyprus. We can also see that in nine cases, there are three important conditions (ELPR{0} * TRANS{0} * RULA{0}) which seem to be associated with the negative outcome. This means a weak election condition, combined with a weak transparency condition and a weak rule of law condition leads to a negative outcome of 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy. We can also observe two cases (Latvia and Portugal) in which the weak condition of executive accountability is important for the generation of the negative outcome of 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy.

5.4. Minimizing Value the [1] Configurations (With Logical Remainders)

To achieve more parsimony, it is necessary to run the TOSMANA to include non-observed cases, called "logical remainders".[1] The logical remainders constitute a pool of potential cases that can be used

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We should add that, for all the csQCA tests which include such "logical remainders", we systematically checked for "contradictory simplifying [1] assumptions" (CSAs). If such CSAs were to be observed, it would be a problem which would need to be solved by further tests (Rihoux & Ragin

by TOSMANA to produce a more parsimonious minimal formula. Including the non-observed cases enables one to express those 41 cases in a simpler way (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009, pp. 60-61). Running again the TOSMANA procedure, we obtain the following terms, in the form of four possible (partly) alternative solutions.

The first possible (partly) alternative solution:

ELPR{1}TRANS{0}EXPC{1} +	ELPR{1}CRPL{0}EXPC{1} +	TRANS{0}CRPL{0}RULA{1} +	TRANS{1}CRPL{1}EXAC{1}
(France+ Austria)	(Israel)	(South Korea)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium+ UK)

The second possible (partly) alternative solution:

ELPR{1}TRANS{0}EXPC{1} +	ELPR{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1} +	TRANS{0}CRPL{0}RULA{1} +	TRANS{1}CRPL{1}EXAC{1}
(France+ Austria)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Israel+ Austria)	(South Korea)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium+ UK)

The third possible (partly) alternative solution:

ELPR{1}TRANS{0}EXAC{0} +	ELPR{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1} +	TRANS{0}CRPL{0}RULA{1} +	TRANS{1}CRPL{1}EXAC{1}
(France)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Israel+ Austria)	(South Korea)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium+ UK)

2009, 2010, Hai Do 2008; Vanderborght & Yamasaki 2004). Gladly, none of our tests have produced such CSAs – so, we can consider our minimal formulas (for the "1" and "0" outcomes, respectively) as being logically valid, and as being a solid starting point for interpretation.

The fourth possible (partly) alternative solution:

ELPR{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1} +	TRANS{0}CRPL{0}RULA{1} +	TRANS{0}RULA{1}EXAC{0} +	TRANS{1}CRPL{1}EXAC{1}
(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Israel+ Austria)	(South Korea)	(France)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium+ UK)

In order to choose the most relevant solution among those four options, we need to exploit both theoretical and case-based knowledge.

In terms of theoretical knowledge, we can see that EXPC{1} & EXAC{1} & ELPR{1} are particularly important conditions for the [1] outcome 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy". First, EXPC (Executive policy capacity) includes strategic planning, inter-ministerial coordination, knowledge management, consultation and communication processes, as well as policy implementation and institutional learning capacity. Strong executive capacity hence plays a key role for the positive outcome of 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy. The evidence-based policy making under RIA application as well as the quality and sustainability of the RIA process with society consultation is particularly important.

Secondly, EXAC (Executive accountability) is a core condition in the policy making process, seeking to assess the extent to which participation and oversight competencies are produced and cultivated. This examines the extent to which other actors who perform essential functions in consolidating and mediating interests in a political system are able to participate in policymaking and monitor the process at each step along the way. This influences the oversight function, which in part reflects the government's obligation to account for its actions to citizens, parliaments, the media, parties and interest groups and the effectiveness of government communication. It also helps in examining how well a government acquires and disseminates information, and the extent to which it involves and activates various elements of society in formulating and implementing policy.

Thirdly, ELPR (Election process) is related to the core procedural democratic conditions including voting and registration rights, protecting the interests of national security or public order, public health or morals, or protecting the rights and freedoms of others, fair access to the media and other means of communication, the opportunity for all citizens to exercise their right of participation in national elections, access to an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for voting and voter registration, private and public party financing, electoral campaign financing transparency, and the opportunity for citizens to take binding political decisions.

In terms of case-based knowledge, if we examine a specific group of cases (Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Israel and Austria), we can observe that the ELPR condition is important to generate the positive outcome 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy. However this condition alone does not suffice: for the outcome 'equal and fair society contribution of social policy' to occur, ELPR (strong election process) has to be combined with some other conditions such as EXPC{1} & EXAC{1} (strong executive policy capacity and strong executive accountability). Based on our case knowledge, we conclude that the configuration "ELPR{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1}" is empirically more relevant, as well as ELPR as a particularly important individual condition influencing the outcome.

Also examining the cases, and considering the "simplifying assumptions" generated by TOSMANA, we observe that the conditions of TRANS{1}CRPL{1}EXAC{1} (cases: Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium and UK) can generate the outcome 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy. We can obtain a list of these simplifying assumptions from the TOSMANA software and lay them out in the report of the analysis – five of them were used as follows:

- ELPR{1}TRANS{0}CRPL{0}RULA{0}EXPC{1}EXAC{1}
- ELPR{1}TRANS{0}CRPL{0}RULA{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1}
- ELPR{1}TRANS{0}CRPL{1}RULA{0}EXPC{1}EXAC{1}
- ELPR{1}TRANS{1}CRPL{0}RULA{0}EXPC{1}EXAC{1}
- ELPR{1}TRANS{1}CRPL{1}RULA{0}EXPC{1}EXAC{1}

Based on this theory- and case-based reasoning, we are thus able to opt for the third solution:

ELPR{1}TRANS{0}EXAC{0} +	ELPR{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1} +	TRANS{0}CRPL{0}RULA{1} +	TRANS{1}CRPL{1}EXAC{1}
(France)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Israel+ Austria)	(South Korea)	(Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway+ Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium+ UK)

It consists of four terms, each one of which combines three conditions linked with the '1' outcome value. We have therefore gained much more parsimony and analytical strength. We can read this solution as follows, not considering the specific cases of France and South Korea (see above): the positive outcome ('equal and fair society' contribution of social policy) is observed:

(1) In countries that combine the conditions [ELPR{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1}] of strong democratic election process, high executive policy capacity and high executive accountability (Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Israel and Austria) .
Or
(2) in countries that combine the conditions [TRANS{1}CRPL{1}EXAC{1}] of good transparency (high level of information access), good civil rights and political liberties and high executive accountability (Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Slovenia, Czech Rep., Belgium and UK).
For the purpose of further interpretation, we choose to concentrate on one specific path which covers the largest number of cases, as follows (formula 5 – which is in fact one term within a formula):
ELPR{1}EXPC{1}EXAC{1} (strong democratic election process and high executive capacity and high executive accountability) → 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy (Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Israel and Austria) .

5.5. Minimizing Value the [0] Configurations (With Logical Remainders)

As we do not expect to find strong causal symmetry in social phenomena (Rihoux, de Meur 2009, 62-63), we obtain the following minimal formula which contains partly alternative terms:

RULA {0} +	TRANS{0} EXPC{0} +	TRANS{1} EXAC{0} +	CRPL{0} EXPC{0} +	ELPR{0}TRANS {0}CRPL{1} +	ELPR{0}TRANS {1}CRPL{0}
(Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria+ Cyprus+ Turkey+ Slovakia+ Mexico, Japan+ Malta)	(Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria+ Cyprus+ Malta+ Italy)	(Latvia, Portugal+ Slovakia)	(Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria+ Slovakia+ Greece+ Malta)	(Cyprus+ Spain)	(Chile)

It consists of six terms, each one of which combines two conditions (more frequently) or three conditions (for three specific cases) linked with the '0' outcome value, with the exception of the RULA condition which, as a single condition, corresponds to the first term of the solution. The formula can be read as follows (if we do not consider the specific cases of Cyprus, Spain and Chile): the negative outcome ('un-equal and un-fair society' contribution of social policy) is observed:

(1) In countries that display the singular condition [RULA{0}], i.e. weak rule of law (Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, Slovakia, Mexico, Japan and Malta)

Or

(2) In countries that combine the conditions of [TRANS{0}EXPC{0}] i.e. weak transparency (weak level of information access) and weak executive policy capacity (Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta and Italy) ;

Or

(3) In countries that combine the conditions [CRPL{0}EXPC{0}] of weak civil rights and political liberties and weak executive policy capacity (Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Greece and Malta) ;

For further interpretation, we must investigate un-equal and un-fair society contribution of social policies and choose to concentrate on one specific path which covers the largest number of cases, as follows (formula 6 – which is in fact one term within a formula):

Therefore: [TRANS{0}EXPC{0}] of weak transparency (weak level of information access) and weak executive policy capacity → 'un-equal and un-fair society' contribution of social policy.

6. Discussions and Conclusions and Implications for the Sustainability in Vietnam
6.1. Discussions with Synthesis and Further Interpretation

Our core research question has been to try and identify the core combinations of policy conditions that generate more favourable or more unfavourable outcomes of social policies. The csQCA analysis has enabled us to produce some core QCA solutions. Examining these solutions, is it possible to explain? more inductively and thus relating to some specific country examples, the contrasted social policy making processes in OECD and EU countries.

1. We have observed some degree of symmetry for the following four condition variables: TRANS, RULA, EXPC, EXAC ["0' for the 0 outcome, and "1" for 1 outcome] in the minimal formulas. The EXPC condition (strong executive capacity), specifically, appears to be a particularly important condition for generating the [1] outcome "'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy"; conversely, the [0] outcome " un-equal and un-fair society' of social policy" is also strongly linked to weak executive policy capacity. If we consider the sub-population of high performing country cases

concerned (Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, USA, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Israel, Austria), we observed that the score of these countries on the EXPC condition varies quite a lot; hence we chose to examine specifically the country with the highest score (Finland) and the lowest score (Lithuania).

The contrast is evidenced in Finnish case, the public institutions here were born to support the social policy performance while the Lithuanian political institutions did not support the social policy performance well. Thus social policies have their owned problems. In other words, the outcomes of social policies are not the products of the political process. We see that: In the Finnish case, with regards to executive capacity, strategic-planning processes are deeply integrated into policy making, the Prime Minister's Office has broad policy-review capabilities and works closely with ministries. Inter-ministerial coordination is strong at all levels. RIAs use is systematic, with high quality. Interest organizations are regularly involved in the legislative process. Municipal governments must meet strict standards, institutional self-monitoring has been intensified, with the results made publicly available. The outcome is positive such as with a generally strong safety net; the education system is of high quality (though higher-education graduation rates are somewhat low) and there are strong redistributive policies; health care is generally good, with comparatively low costs; child-poverty rates are low, and women's employment rates high; the pension system prevents poverty, and ongoing reforms are addressing fiscal concerns.

In the case of Lithuania, we see a significant institutional reform ability pertaining to executive capacity and strategic planning. The country is active and well institutionalized while the government office has been repeatedly reorganized with policy-evaluation capabilities improved. Line ministries have considerable autonomy. Informal coordination is important, but subordinated to formal decision-making mechanisms. The outcome is rather positive with regard to social policies, but there are several weaknesses such as education quality, even though tertiary attainment is comparatively high. The share of women employed is high, but family policy is fragmented and focused on high-risk families. However, residents give poor ratings to the quality of the health care system and national spending on health is comparatively low and inefficient; child-poverty rates remain concerning, and child-care provision is insufficient.

In regard to the other conditions, we see that strong executive capacity [EXPC] condition plays a key role for the [1] outcome 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy in two further cases, France and South Korea. Indeed, although the conditions TRANS and EXAC display a [0] value for France, and TRANS also a [0] value for South Korea, these two countries have generated a [1] outcome because of the strong condition of ELPR{1} (democracy election process) for France and RULA{1} (strong rule of law) for South Korea. Hence, the democracy election process and strong rule of law appear to be important for these formulas, but yet they cannot independently produce or fully explain the outcome. Conversely, we observe the interesting asymmetry of the following conditions ELPR, EXPC, EXAC that we see the conditions ELPR {0} and EXAC {0} did not appear to produce [0] outcome as expected. On the one hand, they contribute to generating the [1] outcome in the minimal configuration in many countries. The [0] outcome could be produced by the combination of [TRANS{0}EXPC{0}], i.e. a combination of weak transparency (level of information access) and weak executive capacity.

The RULA{0} (low rule of law) only plays an important role in the explanation of the [0] outcome ('un-equal and un-fair society' contribution of social policy), though there is also some level of symmetry for the [1] outcome. In formula 2, we see that the outcome "'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy" is produced by a combination of TRANS{1} * RULA{1} * EXAC{1} in some countries, as well RULA{1} * EXPC{1} in the case of France, Austria and South Korea. Regarding the [0] outcome, the combination of conditions [TRANS{0}EXPC{0}] is the key point: if the conditions "transparency" and "executive capacity" are weak, this is a necessary and sufficient combination that eads to an un-equal and un-fair society' of social policy (for quite a large set of countries: Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta and Italy). From our case knowledge, examining the Romania case, we can confirm that the combination of low transparency and low executive capacity has typically led to the [0] outcome. Indeed, with scarce resources, Romania falls into the bottom ranks internationally with

respect to social policies. Poverty levels are the EU's highest, producing significant migration pressure. Income equality has declined since the crisis, but the Roma remain marginalized. Inadequate funding undermines quality in the universal public health care system. Bribes are solicited even for basic services. Parental-leave benefits are generous; however, fertility rates are low and child-poverty rates high. Affordable child care is scarce. Pensions have been increased from a low level, but remain comparatively low. Sustainability remains a concern despite a rise in the retirement age, and low wages minimize inbound-immigration flows.

6.2. Conclusions and Implications for the Sustainability in Vietnam

Our systematic comparative analysis of 41 OECD and EU countries, exploiting the configuration of QCA logic, reveals that if the combination of a strong democratic election process, high executive capacity and high executive accountability, then it is the 'equal and fair society' contribution of social policy possibly. Further, civil rights, political liberties and access to information are all important, but they are not key conditions linking directly to the positive outcome. By contrast, it is interesting to observe the combination of weak transparency and weak executive capacity, which then is possibly leading to the social policies outcome of 'un-equal and un-fair society'.

Returning to the core research at hand, our empirical analyses have provided strong evidence that the conditions – favourable or unfavourable – under which social policies are designed and implemented does have a strong impact. These impacted in different ways, and manifest a varying contribution to social policies, with the progression toward a more equal and more society. In particular: if social policies are designed and implemented amidst a favourable combination of conditions (solid democratic election process, high executive capacity and high executive accountability), those social policies possibly better address the needs or rights of a nation's citizen. Conversely, if social policies are designed and implemented in conditions of weak transparency and weak executive capacity, the needs or rights of the people cannot be satisfied.

On the pattern of Vietnam (3.2), the sustainable development in Vietnam also depends on social policies. From the results of research is shown that if the strong democratic election process, high executive capacity and high executive accountability, then 'equal and fair society' outcomes of social policies possibly contribute the sustainability. In Viet Nam's current political setting, the National Assembly is the highest government organisation and highest representative body of the people. Therefore, the reform in election should be done to improve quality of National Assembly members who are qualified in dealing with issues relating to 'equal and fair society' outcome of social policies. For example, the parliamentary skills and knowledge for legislating and oversight and legal frameworks specifically related to social policy problems.

From OECD and EU perspectives, it requires very transparency in the social policy planning, formulation and implementation in Vietnam. More participation in social policy making requires new mode of consultation which also needs high capacity of policy makers. The social policy can contribute and enhance sustainable development if the capacity of executive government in social policies is developed to ensure the 'equal and fair society' outcomes.

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Table 1.
Model specification.

	Variables	**Coded**
Outcome variable	Equal and fair society in social policies	EFs
Condition variables	Election process	ELPR
	Transparency measured by level of information access	TRANS
	Civil rights and political liberties	CRPL
	Rule of law	RULA
	Executive policy capacity	EXPC
	Executive accountability	EXAC